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1. Introduction  
A feature of Australia’s team sports is that the various leagues operate with labour 
market controls, namely draft systems and salary caps, with the objective of these 
controls being the creation of a more even, and therefore more financially stable 
leagues.  Both the A-League and the National Rugby League (NRL) competitions 
operate with just a salary cap, but the Australian Football League’s (AFL) also 
implements a national draft. What I will therefore examine in this presentation is how 
draft systems and salary cap systems operate, and the potential legal ramifications in 
using these labour market controls.  In order to understand the legal aspects of these 
labour markets the restraint of trade doctrine needs to be examined.  
 
2. The Restraint of Trade Doctrine   
From a legal perspective the potential problem with labour market controls are that 
they may not allow players to select the employer of their choice, or may force them 
to accept a wage lower than they would earn if a salary cap was not in operation. 
Labour market controls may therefore be a restraint of trade under the test developed 
in the case of Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company Ltd 1
 
 
which is now known as the Nordenfelt test.  
This test states that contracts which prevent a person from carrying out their trade will 
be in restraint of trade, unless it is reasonably necessarily to protect the legitimate 
interests of the party imposing the restraint, not unreasonable in regard to the party on 
whom the restraint is imposed, and not injurious to the public.2
 
 Thus in regard to draft 
systems and salary cap, the restraint:  
1. Must be reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate objectives of the 
league, namely the creation of a more even competition;  
2. Must not be unreasonable on the players;  
3. Must not be injurious to the public who watch the games.           
 
It should be noted that the salary cap has never been the subject of litigation, and 
while the AFL draft has, likewise, never been legally challenged, a draft system that 
was implemented by the then New South Wales Rugby League (NSWRL) for the 
competition that was the forerunner of today’s NRL was challenged in Adamson v 
NSWRL.3
 
   
                                               
1 [1893] AC 535.  
2 Ibid, 565. For a discussion of Nordenfelt in regard to the other labour market controls utilised by the 
AFL, namely the salary cap, see Antonio Buti, ‘Salary caps in Professional Teams Sports: an 
Unreasonable Restraint of Trade’, (1999) 14 Journal of Contract  Law 130-153.       
3 (1990) 27 FCR 335. 
 2 
3. Draft Systems and the Law   
    (a) What is a Draft System?  
The AFL draft was introduced in 1986 and was modelled on the system devised by 
the National Football League (NFL) in 1935. Like all draft systems, it is based on the 
principle that the last placed team will have first choice of the available players, with 
the rest of the teams then having a selection in the reverse order from which they 
finished the previous season’s competition. This process is then repeated for a second, 
third round etc. Thus, the team which finished last in the AFL season will receive the 
first selection in the national draft to choose whoever it considers to be the best young 
player in Australia. The team that won the premiership in that year on the other hand 
will have to wait until every other club has received its first round draft pick before 
being able to have its first selection.   
 
In the AFL draft four or five rounds are held each year, and since it mainly involves 
players who have never played in the AFL, it is known as an external draft. There is 
also a pre-season daft which is usually for players who have already played for 
another club, but were not traded or re-selected in the national draft. It is therefore 
known as an internal draft There is now a third draft, known as the rookie draft, where 
players can be selected by the clubs to be placed on the clubs’ rookie list which is 
essentially a secondary list for the clubs. Each club can nominate two rookies who can 
play senior football, but the rest cannot, unless needed to replace an injured senior 
player.   
 
 (b) The Rugby League Draft   
One of the first things that was examined in Adamson was the question of the 
legitimate aims of the party that was implementing the draft, namely the NSWRL, and 
the court accepted that it was a desirable objective for a sporting league to have the 
teams as evenly matched for talent as possible at the beginning of each season.4 
However, it was then held that the NSWRL draft rules did very little to protect the 
interests of the League and the clubs, but at the same time limited the players’ choice 
of employer by these rules. This was seen as interfering with the interests of the 
players, particularly as it operated after the expiration of their contracts.5
 
  It should 
also be noted that this draft was an internal draft, that is, it operated on players already 
playing for a club in the NSWRL. It is arguably a greater restraint, in my opinion, to 
restrict the movement of players already in the competition and I agree that the 
internal draft used by the NSWRL was an unreasonable restraint of trade.  
It should be noted that the court did state that the NSWRL could reconsider the rules 
which suggests that a set of different draft rules could represent a reasonable restraint 
of trade.6
 
  These statements indicate that the decision in Adamson was that just the 
draft system brought before the court was a restraint of trade, not all draft systems. 
What also should be noted is that under our adversarial system it is the parties 
involved which bring the cases to the court, which means that despite the decision in 
Adamson the AFL draft is still allowed to operate. But what I will now examine is the 
question of the legality of the AFL draft system.  
                                               
4 Ibid at 560.   
5 Adamson v NSWRL (Appeal Case) (1991) 31 FCR 242 at 281-2. 
6 Ibid 297.     
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    (c) The AFL Draft 
It is now over 20 years since the Adamson decision, yet there has not been even a 
threat of anyone challenging the AFL draft. One reason is that the players, through 
their players’ association, the Australian Football League Players’ Association 
(AFLPA) have agreed that both the draft and salary cap systems are for the overall 
benefit of the game. Thus it does not matter if a court would declare the AFL draft an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, if the players and clubs are happy with it, then it will 
never reach the courts.  
 
However, if it was ever to be challenged in court, I feel the AFL would have good  
case that it is reasonable. Firstly, the AFL has, in my opinion, strong evidence that 
these systems have created a more even competition. This is shown by the fact that in 
the 1970s and 1980s combined, just five teams won the premiership, yet in both the 
1990s and 2000s, seven different teams won the premiership in each decade. It should  
also be noted that while the AFL draft is restrictive on the players when they first join 
the AFL, they are only bound to the club that drafted them for two years. After that 
they can resign with that club, or ask to be traded to another club in exchange for 
other players or draft selections.  
 
Thus, unlike in the NSWRL draft, players already in the AFL have some bargaining 
power in relationship to what club could now select them. It should be noted that if no 
suitable trade is agreed to by the club who originally selected the player, then that 
player can nominate for the pre-season draft.  If a player change clubs be means of 
this pre-season draft then the original club receives no compensation in the form of 
other players and/or draft picks. There is, therefore, an incentive for clubs to negotiate 
trade deals for players who wish to leave that club.  
 
It can therefore be argued that the AFL can justify the use of the draft system because, 
together with the AFL’s use of a salary cap, it has helped the league achieve its stated 
objective of a more even competition.  
 
The next question is whether it is reasonable on the players, and while it can be 
restrictive on the players’ choice of employer, they arguably receive much better 
wages than they would if the draft was not in operation. The estimates are that the 
AFL generates twice the income as the NRL, mainly because of bigger crowds at the 
matches and more money from television rights. This is why the AFL’s top players 
earn almost double that of the top NRL players which is why the AFL was able to lure 
both Karmichael Hunt and Israel Folau from the NRL. Thus the draft can be deemed 
to be reasonable on the players, despite not always being able to select their employer. 
However, the AFL has just brought in free agency rules, first of all for the 
introduction of the Gold Coast and Greater Western Sydney with both clubs being 
able to select one uncontracted player from the other clubs without having to go 
through the draft. From 2012 players who have played a certain number of games will 
be able to change clubs without having to go through a trade deal. The AFL will then 
determine what the original club should receive as compensation by means of draft 
selections.      
       
The third component of the Nordenfelt test is whether the contract or regulations are 
injurious to the public. It is suggested that the public benefit of the draft is that it has 
ensured a revenue base which allows full time professionalism and with it, players 
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who are fitter and more skillful than previous generations because of the extra time 
they can devote to training. The more even competition has also ensured that 
supporters will not see their team go literally decades without even making the finals, 
as happened in the pre-draft era, as evidenced by Hawthorn’s 32 years without 
making the finals from 1925-1956; South Melbourne (now Sydney) 24 years from 
1946-1969;  Melbourne’s 22 years from 1965-1986 and St. Kilda’s 21 from 1940-60.      
  
While the question as to whether the AFL has created a more even competition or not 
involves an examination of both the draft and salary cap systems, with the NRL it is 
just the salary cap that is in operation.   
 
4. Salary Caps in Australian Sport  
The present day NRL has its origins in the Sydney based competition run by the 
NSWRL which evolved into a more national competition, firstly run by the Australian 
Rugby League (ARL), and then by the NRL. It was the NSWRL that first introduced 
a salary cap in 1990, along with a draft system, though the draft system was 
successfully challenged by the players.7
 
 The salary cap, meanwhile, was dropped 
during the Super League war when News Ltd and the ARL tried to attract the best 
players by offering high wages that were well beyond the revenue being generated.  
The NRL was formed in 1998 after a compromise was reached between News Ltd, 
which was running and financially supporting Super League, and the ARL. Two years 
later a salary cap was introduced to help create a more even, financially more stable  
competition which is recognised by the courts as being a legitimate objective for a 
league.8
 
 Like the AFL, the NRL, from a legal perspective, has to show that the  salary 
cap has created a more even competition, and personally I think that it has with this 
opinion being  based on the fact that teams making the finals, grand finals and been 
premiers over the last ten years has been reasonably well spread amongst all the 
teams. Thus, it can be argued that the salary cap has achieved its objective, but as the 
recent scandal involving Melbourne Storm has shown, clubs may be willing to breach 
the salary cap rules in order to try and win a premiership.               
The Melbourne Storm’s systematic breaches of the salary cap over a five year period 
was achieved by having two sets of contracts: the official ones showing that the 
Melbourne Storm was keeping to its salary cap, and a second set, kept separately, 
which reflected what the players were actually being paid. It was estimated that when 
the Melbourne Storm won the 2009 premiership it was around $400,000 over the 
salary cap, and around $700,000 over for the 2010 season. Overall, the extra 
payments were estimated to be around $1.7m for the five year period.9
   
        
The NRL immediately announced that penalties were to be imposed on the Melbourne 
Storm, the most significant being the loss of the 2007 and 2009 premierships, the 
repayment of $1.1m in prizemoney and a $500, 000 fine, lose of all competition 
points already accumulated for the 2010 season, with the club also not being able to 
compete for competition points for the remainder of the 2010 season.     
 
                                               
7 Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League (1990) 27 FCR 535.  
8 See Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League (1990) 27 FCR 535 at 561; Buckley v Tutty (1971) 
125 CLR 353 at 377.   
9 Dean Ritchie, ‘NRL caught in Storm of cheats,’ The Daily Telegraph, 23 April, 2010 at 2.     
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It is my opinion that the NRL had no choice but to impose these penalties since it 
could not allow Melbourne to keep the titles as it would have been unfair on the other 
clubs which had stayed under the salary cap. The fine and loss of prizemoney had to 
be imposed to act as a deterrent to other clubs which may contemplate deliberately 
breaching the salary cap. Perhaps the most controversial was the decision not to allow 
the Melbourne Storm to keep the points it had already won in the 2010 season, nor 
compete for points in the rest of the season, even though the Melbourne Storm players 
indicated they would be willing to take pay cuts in order to allow the club to get under 
salary cap.10
 
 However, the Melbourne Storm would still have the team it had acquired 
while in breach of the NRL rules and again this would have been unfair on the other 
clubs.  
What the Melbourne Storm scandal therefore illustrates is that it can be difficult to 
enforce a salary cap. However, it was eventually detected. While the hope was that 
the penalties handed out after the 2002 Canterbury Bulldogs salary cap scandal would 
be sufficient deterrent has proven to be incorrect, the even harsher penalties handed 
out to the Melbourne Storm will hopefully be sufficient to act as a future deterrent. 
What is also interesting about the Melbourne Storm salary cap scandal is the fact  
there was never any suggestion that the NRL salary cap would be challenged in court,  
which indicates that the NRL salary cap is here to stay, with this being supported by 
the chief executives of the clubs.11
 
 
The recently formed A-League competition also implemented a salary cap from its 
very first season, with it presently being $2.5m, though each club can pay marquee 
player outside of the cap. Robbie Flower, for instance, has been the marquee player at 
firstly the North Queensland Fury, and now the Perth Glory. Given the fact that the 
fact that many of the clubs are in financial trouble, it would appear that player salaries 
need to be reduced, if anything.        
 
5.  Conclusion  
Since the introduction of the draft, the AFL has gone from strength to strength with a 
truly national competition which draws large crowds and receives substantial money  
from television rights. It can point to a number of indicators to support its claim that it 
has created a more even competition and has therefore achieved the legitimate 
objective of the draft.  While the Melbourne Storm scandal has highlighted the fact 
that salary caps can be hard to enforce, the harsh penalties imposed by the NRL 
should act as a deterrent to other clubs. The A-League, AFL and NRL salary caps  
appear to have become integral parts of how these competitions operate and are likely 









                                               
10 Phil Rothfield, ‘Let the Storm start again on zero,’ The Sunday Telegraph, 25 April, 2010 at 46.    
11 Brad Walter, ‘CEO meeting should look back to go forward’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 May, 
2010 at 24; Stuart Honeysett, ‘NRL is second rate, says players,’ The Australian, 5 May, 2010 at 48.    
